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Since 2008, many firms have begun to use Twitter as a form of communicating news to consumers and
investors. Twitter enables the firm to manage the information content of the tweet because of its emphasis
on the 140 characters. In addition, the marginal investor who may read this “managed” tweet and react
accordingly is most likely unsophisticated since Twitter is an information-pushing platform rather than an
information-pulling platform such as Bloomberg. As a result, I hypothesize that using Twitter to
communicate with investors actually leads to asset mispricing. I document a negative relationship between
the log of abnormal volume and firm-initiated announcement tweets for both product recalls and monthly
sales announcements. I also document a negative relationship between the absolute value of abnormal
equity returns and firm-initiated announcement tweets for monthly sales data. Further analysis shows that
this relationship holds true only for monthly sales events with positive returns and not for those with
negative returns. This suggests that it is because Twitter serves to lower information asymmetry, resulting
in less positive returns than before. These results have implications for understanding how dissemination
and unsophisticated trading can affect liquidity and market efficiency.
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Introduction

I.

Many studies find that company disclosure through financial reports, management discussion,
management forecasts, earnings calls, and other company announcements reduces information asymmetry,
which is important for efficient capital markets and lowering the cost of capital for firms. However,
perfectly accurate and unbiased disclosure can in fact be costly in many ways. For example, it could lead
to an overreaction in capital markets or reveal competitive advantages to competitors or litigators.
Additionally, even with a decision to disclose information, firms may not be successful in disseminating it
to investors. Traditionally, firms releases announcements on its website and sent information to newswires
such as PR Newswire and Businesswire. From there, the press selects which news to cover. However, there
is some bias involved; the press cherry-picks the news it wants to cover. This usually means that press
coverage focuses on more visible firms as the public would be more interested to read about them (Miller
2006).
With the advent of social media, the nature of corporate disclosure has changed. Firms can now directly
access investors and consumers through sites such as Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, etc.
Followers of a social media account get push notifications about news; they can share news of interest with
family and friends. In 2013, the SEC ruled that social media is a viable source of dissemination of corporate
information.3 The extent to which firms use social media as a mode of dissemination today greatly varies
by the type and size of the firm as it is not required by the SEC. As a result, the increase of dissemination
of important information through these online platforms will only increase moving forward, and the
implications of this have not been heavily studied.
This study uses Twitter as its empirical setting for specific reasons that will be described below, as well
as the fact that it is a representative microblogging site. It was founded in 2006 and enables its users to post
and follow those who post “tweets”, a 140-character message. In 2013, Twitter was one of the top 10 most
visited websites in the world. Currently, it has 500 million users (up from 100 million in 2012), making it
one of the fastest growing social media sites. 4 Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests that many
companies use Twitter or Facebook as one of its primary social media outlets to release information.
Between the top social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook, Twitter was specifically chosen for this
study because of its following three key characteristics:
1. Information Content. This is the main focus of this study. While studies have shown that disclosure does
reduce information asymmetry, this would depend on the quality of the content provided in the Tweet.
While firms are disseminating information, it may be highly biased in order to manage market reaction
and minimize the cost of disseminating information. Twitter is a way for the firm to control the content
that is disseminated in wide audiences. Before, firms were less able to do this as press coverage had a
flavor of its own bias in the article. In the 140 characters allowed in a Tweet, a firm is able to prioritize
the information of the announcement and influence what about the announcement the investor sees. In
psychology, this appeals to the theory of belief perseverance, which is the idea that one sticks to his or
her initial beliefs even if there is evidence contradicting this. Additionally, the language of a Tweet
allows for more sentimental words rather than boilerplate and standard language that is usually found
in a company announcement.
3

In July of 2012, the CEO of Netflix posted on his personal Facebook that Netflix had consumed 1 billion hours that
month for the first time. This sparked discussion on whether social media was an appropriate method of
dissemination of company announcements. The SEC announced in 2013 that companies could use social media to
announce information as long as investors were aware that social media was being used to disseminate.
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2. Quantity of Information. Firms can choose to exceed the 140 character by posting several times about
the same event. This not only increases the amount of information that will reach investors but also
catches the attention of investors. This is particularly useful for small firms.
3. Reach. Compared to before, Twitter is a form of pushing information rather than pulling information.
This means that in order to get news about a company before, investors had to seek it out. Here, the
company pushes information to anyone who follows the company on Twitter. This is precisely how, as
mentioned before, the reach of the news is more broadly disseminated. Additionally, those who receive
the information can also participate in its dissemination; they can posts to share them with their own
followers, leading to a network effect.
A study by Blankespoor, Miller, and White (2014) suggests that Twitter and other forms of social media
help reduce information asymmetry amongst investors and allows for higher market liquidity as a result of
broad dissemination. They measured bid-ask spreads as a proxy for liquidity and found that Twitter results
in narrower bid-ask spreads. However, the relationship between liquidity and market efficiency is highly
debated in research. Theory suggests that when liquidity increases, informed traders are able to trade against
uninformed traders with lower transaction costs (Kyle 1985). This encourages informed traders to seek out
information in order to take advantage of these arbitrage opportunities, making the market more efficient
and reducing information asymmetry. On the contrary, liquidity may actually decrease market efficiency.
This is based off the assumption that increased liquidity is actually a proxy for unsophisticated trading,
which could drive the price of the security away from its fundamental value. The study by Blankespoor,
Miller, and White (2014) does not specify whether the type of liquidity that results from dissemination
through social media is efficiency-increasing or efficiency-decreasing. This leads to the development of the
primary question being studied: how does the nature of information disseminated by companies affect
trading behavior? This is motivated by understanding whether the characteristics of social media actually
help provide valuable information dissemination and increase market efficiency or serve to increase
unsophisticated trading, leading to pricing away from the fundamental security value.
To investigate this question, I document how the effect of companies disseminating information through
Twitter affects the abnormal returns and trading volume of the stock in a (0, 2) trading window around
product recalls and monthly automobile manufacturing sales announcements. I collect data from before the
firm opened a Twitter account (“Pre-Twitter Period) and after the firm opened a Twitter account (“PostTwitter Period”) in order to observe what the effect of disseminating information on Twitter has on trading
behavior. All of the companies in the study disseminated information using traditional methods of PR
Newswire and announcements on the company website as discussed earlier in both the Pre-Twitter and the
Post-Twitter Period. The main difference between the two periods was that these companies also tweet
about the announcement in the Post-Twitter Period, on top of releasing a newswire about it.
The next section provides more background, related literature, and a hypothesis development. The
section after that will discuss the nature of the data and the variables collected. Section 4 provides
descriptive statistics as well as results. Section 5 talks about potential issues. Section 6 will conclude.

II.

Background, Motivation, and Related Literature

Information Asymmetry and Disclosure
As mentioned earlier, the firm faces a tradeoff in the decision to disclose information. This discussion
is relevant as the firm faces a decision on not only deciding to disclose at all on Twitter since it is not

required by the SEC to do so but also to what extent it should disclose on Twitter. On one hand, the firm
could increase liquidity, decrease its cost of capital, and reduce information asymmetry overall (Kim and
Verrecchia 1994) with additional voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, there are costs that the firm
could incur by disclosing. Berger and Hann (2007) suggest that agency costs and proprietary costs are
reasons why managers may choose to withhold information. Supported by this is a study by Hayes and
Lundholm (1996) which also documents that proprietary costs are a reason why managers are hesitant to
disclose certain types of information. Another potential concern that a firm may have is increased
vulnerability to litigation through voluntary disclosure; however, a study by Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005)
did not find evidence that voluntary disclosure led to litigation. In fact, results seemed to point to the
opposite idea. In addition to these factors, managers may also use voluntary disclosure to influence certain
factors, such as analyst following as documented by Lang and Lundholm (1996). Their study found that
increased voluntary disclosure can lead to increased investor following and reduced information
asymmetry. Additionally, the results of the study by Bushee and Noe (2000) support the idea that firms
with better disclosure practices have a higher institutional following; this leads to stock price volatility. To
support this, Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that increased voluntary disclosure is linked to better stock
performance in conjunction with institutional ownership, analyst following, and stock liquidity.
Many of the studies above use the term “disclosure” slightly differently from this study. For example,
the data collected by Healy and Palepu (2001) use firms that “have made large and sustained improvements
in their disclosure quality” (Healy and Palepu 2001). Because there is an overall increase in the quality of
the disclosure, it may be that information asymmetry decreases in this case because the firm and
management are subsequently seen as more credible overall to capital markets. This is a significant
distinction from my study; this type of disclosure is only true for the monthly sales data collected compared
to the product recall data, as will be discussed later.
Liquidity and Unsophisticated Trading
The study mentioned earlier by Blankespoor, Miller, and White (2014) found that company-initiated
Tweets increase liquidity. Liquidity is generally considered to be good in capital markets because it is
generally linked with market efficiency. The Kyle model (1985) shows that when informed investors enter
the market, bid-ask spreads widen. However, his model does not necessarily hold the opposite result for
uninformed investors. When uninformed investors enter the market, the bid-ask spread could narrow but
could also widen depending on the aggressiveness at which rational investors arbitrage. If the results of the
aforementioned study could be explained by the entrance of uninformed investors in the market, then this
begs the question whether social media as a method of dissemination leads to market efficiency because
liquidity leads to lower trading cost (O’Hara 2005) or whether it leads to asset mispricing. This is further
explored in this study.
Several empirical studies give evidence in favor of both theories. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)
document that stocks without close substitutes experience a higher price jump when included in the S&P
index. These stocks are more illiquid and hence experience asset mispricing. Sadka and Scherbina (2007)
suggest that there exists a close relationship between liquidity and mispricing by using analyst disagreement
as a proxy for firms with high information asymmetry and liquidity. However, other studies support the
opposing view that increased liquidity actually decreases. Bloomfield, OHara, and Saar (2009) suggest in
an experimental study that when uninformed traders enter the trading scene, they increase market liquidity
but at the same time hurt efficiency because markets are unable to correct the asset mispricing. Flepp,
Nuesch, and Franck (2014) demonstrate that the type of liquidity does indeed matter for market efficiency

by showing that liquidity through the entrance of noise traders decreases market efficiency at the betting
exchange on weekends but not weekdays.
Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2006) prove that in the presence of three conditions 1) misinterpretation of
available information. 2) non-cancellation of uninformed trade and 3) limits on rational arbitrage, trading
from not fully rational traders drive prices away from fundamental values for at least temporarily.
Additionally, it has been empirically shown that when a firm’s message board (Yahoo) was established, this
lead to increase in daily trading volume, lower returns, and higher volatility (Jones 2006).
Social Media
Social media refers to “electronic communication through which users create online communities to
share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content”5. Because of the sheer number of people
on Twitter and the advent of Cashtags, where users can use #{Insert firm ticker here} to hashtag their Tweets.
Because this is linked to financial information, now it is very simple for people to find financial information
about a company on Twitter by searching by the firm’s cashtag (example: General Motors’s (GM) cashtag
is $GM). As mentioned before, it has been shown that Twitter as a form of dissemination increases the
liquidity of the stock, using bid-asks spreads as a proxy for liquidity. This is especially true for small
visibility firms (Blankespoor, Miller, White 2014). Another study showed that using social media such as
Twitter and Facebook to disseminate news about product recalls help lower negative market reactions
because of the firm’s ability to do “damage control” (Lee, Hutton, Shu 2015). Outside of firm-initiated
Tweets, another study showed that sentiment of tweets (including non-company tweets) is associated with
abnormal returns (Oh and Sheng 2011), and message volume can predict next-day trading volume (Wysocki
1998).
Product Recalls
There are four main reasons for using product recalls as one of the announcements of study. The first
is that it is a “compelling” announcement to post for firms. This is because the number and types of
important firm announcements put out on Twitter may be relatively low since (a) Twitter is a relatively new
source of dissemination and (b) Investor Relations may be hesitant to provide information on the Twitter
for fear that a mistake could blow the situation out of proportion. This is supported by the fact that the 2013
AON Risk Management survey cited social media as an upcoming area of risk for a company. However,
due to chances of litigation that the company did not take enough measures to announce a product recall,
companies post about recalls on Twitter since it directly affects consumers and would be an item of interest.
The second reason is that product recalls is what one would consider a “negative” event – rational traders
would trade in the same direction. This fulfils one of the required three conditions in the study by Barber,
Odean, and Zhu (2006) mentioned earlier. The third reason is that product recalls are unexpected in nature
in contrast to earnings announcements, which are anticipated. This means that investors have less
preconceived notions about the event before they read about it in the news or on Twitter or have expectations.
However, it should be noted that if a firm consistently has many product recalls, this advantage may not
exist anymore. The fourth reason is that product recalls fits in with the design of the study well. The nature
of product recalls has not changed significantly over the last 10 years, the period of the study.
However, using product recalls as one of the events in the study has certain disadvantages. One is it
suffers from a possible endogeneity problem. The decision to disclose information about product recalls on
Twitter is an endogenous one, evidenced from the fact that very few of the companies that are listed as
5
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having product recalls on the CPSC website actually disclose anything about a recall on their Twitter
account. This is discussed in more detail in Section V. Additionally, the sample size is limited for this very
reason.
Monthly Sales Announcement
There are three primary reasons why monthly sales announcement was chosen as one of the
announcement types being collected in the data. The first is that, in contrast to product recalls, monthly
sales are not necessarily a negative event. It could be either positive or negative. It may contain more content
to interpret as negative or positive for unsophisticated investors or more room for interpretation. Related to
this, a study found that investors underreact to textual information embedded in news stories (Tetlock, SaarTschansky 2008), which may be the case for a monthly sales announcement. Additionally, it has the benefit
of being an expected announcement. Car companies release monthly sales data during the first week of
every week. For this reason, investors may be able to tell how well a company did that month before it is
released or have expectations about the event. The third reason is that the nature of the disclosure of the
firm with respect to monthly sales is inherently different from product recalls; it builds and reflects a
potential overall increase in disclosure. From the data, we very rarely observe firms choosing certain months
to Tweet about monthly sales and refraining from doing so during certain months. This stems from the fact
that the SEC does not require that announcements be posted on all platforms of dissemination at all times;
it would be very possible for a firm to post only positive announcements on Twitter and never mention a
negative announcement on Twitter (however, firms do not have a such option on PR Newswire).

III.

Sample Selection and Variables

Data Collection
Overall methodology
Two different sets of data was collected for this analysis as mentioned above – product recalls and
monthly car sales announcements. In order to understand how firm-initiated Tweets affect abnormal returns
and abnormal trading volume, I manually collected roughly 90 data points on both recalls and
announcements from before and after the company opened a Twitter account and began tweeting about
company news. All firms included in the study did not change their disclosure behavior as a result of
creating a Twitter account. This means that in addition to the channels they already disseminated through
(ex: PR Newswire and Busineswire), these firms also began to use Twitter as an additional channel of
dissemination. This distinction is important as it is critical for the empirical design; in 2010, Google went
so far as to only release its earnings announcements on social media and its website only. Google would
not have been a firm included in this study, as a result. To further illustrate, I provide an example: in 2006,
Walmart had a product recall that it released a newswire about. In 2010, they had another product recall
which they released a newswire about. The main difference is that in 2010, Walmart also tweeted about it
on its Twitter to alert consumers and investors. Below, I discuss the specific procedures in obtaining the
data for the product recall dataset and the monthly sales announcement dataset.
Product Recalls
To find a list of product recalls, I use the Consumer Product Safety Commission website. Next, I check
whether this company is a) public and b) whether they have issued a newswire about it archived on Factiva.
I also check to make sure that all the data points in the Pre-Twitter sample occur at a point in time before

the company created a Twitter. Next, for the Post-Twitter sample, I use the CPSC list of product recalls and
check whether the company in question a) has a Twitter and b) if so, whether this recall disclosed on Twitter.
After this step, I have a set of companies that have product recalls before and after the company created a
Twitter account and tweeted about the recall. Next, I find the PERMNO using CRSP and use Eventus find
abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume of the stock compared to an estimation length of 255 46
days before the event. In addition to these two response variables, I also collect data on various
characteristics of both the newswire and the Tweet the company posts. 6
Monthly Sales Announcements
Data on General Motors and Honda monthly sales announcements were collected for this sample. This
is because both General Motors and Honda began tweeting about their monthly sales after creating a Twitter
account in 2008, which was imperative to the design of this study. 7 Next, I used Factiva to find the monthly
sales newswires and recorded various characteristics of these announcements which are discussed in more
detail in the next section. In addition to this, I collect information on the tweet(s) that the company posted
for those announcements that occurred after the company opened a Twitter account. I did not include the
month every year (generally January) in which the company announces annual sales as well as monthly
sales since the returns and volume for that month would be an outlier from the other monthly sales
announcements. Lastly, similar to above, I use Eventus to find abnormal returns and abnormal trading
volume of the stock around a 2 day trading window, (0, +2).
Abnormal returns and volume can be calculated by the following equation:

Where Aji is the arithmetic mean return of the common stock of the jth firm computed over the estimation
period Rj from its return on day t.
Response variables and Regressors
Response Variables: The variables of interest that were measured were abnormal returns (Return) and
abnormal log of trading volume (LnVolume), both of which Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) found were
affected in the presence of unsophisticated trading.
Regressors: PrePost is a binary variable and the primary regressor of interest that indicates whether this
product recall was tweeted about (this occurs in the “Post-Twitter” period, or after the company
establishes a Twitter account). If it falls in the pre-Twitter period (before the firms opens a Twitter account)
then it equals 0. This would capture whether the firm tweeting about an announcement had an effect on
abnormal returns or abnormal trading volume.
Because of the two types of events, I control for different things in the two types of events. Below are
descriptions of the relevant control variables for each type of event. There are two types of variables:
variables that characterize the underlying company announcement and ones characterizing the tweets that
the companies also put out in the Post-Twitter period for cross-sectional predictions. I control for these in
the regression to isolate the effect of whether tweeting about an event significantly impacts abnormal returns
or abnormal log of trading volume.

6

Here, the newswire is referred to as the newswire the company releases or the announcement of the company
website. The tweet is the tweet the company posts about the event on its Twitter page.
7
It must be noted that not all firms tweet about its company announcements; Urban Outfitters does not mention any
company related news on its Twitter and keeps its Twitter as a way to advertise its new products and sales.

Product Recalls
Announcement Control Variables
The market cap (market cap) of the company the year of the announcement was recorded. This is a
proxy for the “visibility” of the firm under the assumption that high market cap firms are better known.
Tweet Variables
As discussed before, there are 3 distinct characteristics of tweets that I use to test for the effects of
tweeting: Information Content, Reach, and Quantity. Here, quantity does not apply as no company in
the sample set Tweeted multiple times about the same recall within the (0, +2) period. One is the number
of Retweets of a company Tweet (Retweet). This continuous variable measures the reach in terms of it
reaching additional social networks as people retweet Tweets they read. I predict that as the reach
increases, the effect on abnormal returns and volume should increase. Additionally, Link, a binary
variable, controls for whether the company included a hyperlink to the announcement in the Tweet, which
is another variable controlling for reach. The second characteristic of a tweet is information content.
Problem.or.No measures whether the company mentions the cause of the recall in the tweet, which can
be seen as a form of information content manipulation because an unsophisticated investor may be more
likely to react if the reason for the recall is included. For example, Walmart in 2013 tweeted “Product
Recall Alert: Wahl Total Care due to burn hazard.” Here, they mention that burn hazard is the reason for
the recall. In 2014, Walmart tweeted “#ProductRecall Alert: Comfort Research Bean Bag Chairs”, not
mentioning why the product was being recalled. Numerical is also a variable that measures the
information content; it measures whether the company discloses the number of units recalled in the tweet.
Additionally, Impact controls for the impact of the recall, measured as number of units recalled X price
of each unit. This is because this data set contains high impact recalls such as car recalls in addition to
smaller product recalls such as Bean Bag chairs.
Monthly Sales Announcements
Announcement Control Variables
GM, a binary variable, is 1 if the company is GM, 0 if the company is Honda. Beta controls for the
estimated beta of the firm in the estimation period of 200 days 43 days before the event. This is a relevant
variable for the monthly sales announcements and not product recalls because of the seasonality of the data.
Event controls for whether the event was “positive” or “negative”. This was estimated by looking at whether
monthly sales for that month increased or decreased compared to the same period in the prior year. This is
a standard auto sales measure used in announcements. Up_Net captures the manipulation of the information
by the firm. It is the difference between the number of positive words that appear in the announcement –
the number of negative words that appear in the announcement. Positive words include: Gain, increase, up,
+, positive, crown, top, rising. Negative words include: down, decrease, declining, loss, -. Salesper
measures the percentage increase or decrease in total sales that month compared to the same month the
previous year. SalesNum measures the gross sales of cars that month.
Tweet Variables
Retweet and Link are the same as what was discussed above. Number of Tweets measures the number
of times a company Tweeted about the monthly sales. This is a measure of quantity, one of the 3
characteristics of a tweet that did not apply to the product recall dataset but applies here. NetSent measures
positive words that appear in the Tweets minus the negative words that appear in the Tweets. This is a
measure of the quality of the information provided in the tweet. For example, a company may manipulate
information during a negative sales event by including many positive words to counteract the negative

overall results. I predict that the higher the NetSent in the Post-Twitter period compared to the Pre-Twitter
period, the abnormal returns and trading volume should be higher. Number, a binary variable, measures
whether the firm mentions the gross amount of sales in the Tweet(s). Per, also a binary variable, measures
whether the firm mentions the % increase or decrease of sales in the Tweet(s). Per and Number also measure
the quality of the information provided in the tweet; the most informative tweets would include the %
increase and gross number of sales of that month in the tweet.
Model
To estimate the effect of Twitter on the response variables abnormal return and abnormal log of trading
Volume, I use the model given below. It should be noted that my design is not a difference-in-differences.
That design would not have allowed me to measure various attributes of the tweet.

Where Return
represents either
Abnormal Returns or log (Abnormal Trading Volume). Here, I interact all the Twitter-specific variables
such as Link and Number of Retweets with the PrePost variable. This is so that the effect of dissemination
through Twitter on abnormal returns can be written as

Due to the limited sample size, I use model selection using AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) in order to
find which variables add the most information to the regression as assessed by the likelihood function.
Results
This section examines whether the dissemination through Twitter has an effect on Abnormal Returns and
log(Abnormal Trading Volume).
Using AIC variable selection criterion, the following regressors were selected for product recall.
Volume = B0+ B1Prepost +B2 Retweet*Prepost+ B3Impact+B4Marketcap
Return = B0+ B1Impact
AbsReturn = B0+ B1Retweet +B2 Retweet*Prepost+ B4Marketcap
Using AIC variable selection criterion, the following regressors were selected for monthly sales
announcements.
Volume = B0+ B1salesper +B2 salenum
Return = B0+ B1salesper +B2 salenum
AbsReturn = B0+ B1PrePost+B2 UpNet+ B4salesper

IV.

Regression Results

Because Twitter allows companies to manage the content released to investors, I predict that
disseminating corporate news through Twitter will result in less negative equity returns over the two day
trading window. Because tweets are a form of “pushing” information rather than pull and because
companies have the ability to manage the content of the Tweet, this will result in unsophisticated investors
following these tweets to trade in a positive direction, resulting in a less negative overall return for product
recalls and bad sales events and to higher abnormal returns for positive sales events. This is exacerbated by
the fact that monthly sales announcements do not make top headlines like big recalls, so tweeting about
them will cause more unsophisticated traders to enter than product recalls. I also predict that trading volume

will also increase as a result of dissemination to a much broader audience. If the model yields a significant
coefficient for the variable PrePost, then we may infer that, all else equal, the use of Twitter to disseminate
information did indeed affect the response variable in question, either abnormal returns (Return) or
abnormal trading volume (Volume).
[Insert Table 7 here]
However, results suggest that for both product recalls and sales, the advent of Twitter is insignificant
when comparing the abnormal equity returns. Hence, it appears as if the dissemination of information
through Twitter does not have a significant effect on the abnormal equity returns. However, for
log(abnormal volume), PrePost is significant for both product recalls and monthly sales announcements,
with a p- value of .05 and a coefficient of -1. For the absolute value of abnormal equity returns, PrePost
was significant for monthly sales announcements but not product recalls. For product recall, the only
significant regressor on return was impact of the product recall. For monthly sales, it was salesper and
salesnum. 8
Because it is impossible to know what the market expectations were before those events, I also regress
the absolute value of abnormal returns on the collected variables. For the absolute value of abnormal returns
of product recall, the main effects were the number of Retweets and market cap of the company. It should
also be noted here that the constant was very significant, indicating that there is some variable that accounts
for abnormal returns which I did not collect data for. For the absolute return of monthly sales, PrePost,
UpNet, and the constant were significant. For the trading volume for product recalls, Prepost, Retweet, and
ProblemInfo were significant with p-values of .05. For trading volume for monthly sales, significant
regressors were Prepost, salesnum, link, and beta, all with p-values of less than .05.
This means that disseminating through Twitter does have an effect on the trading volume. While the
coefficient on this is negative, this is possible because the data is in terms of log volume and not sheer
magnitude. A negative coefficient could imply that while the trading volume still increased, the rate at which
trading volume increased actually decreased. This makes sense given the time period; while I hypothesized
that trading would increase as a result of unsophisticated trading, I did not account for the fact that Twitter
took off in popularity in 2008, around the time of the financial crisis, lowering the number of
unsophisticated investors that would enter and trade. Even for events that seemingly would have trades in
one direction like a product recall, it is possible unsophisticated traders were misinterpreting signals in the
opposite direction. This led to cancellation of the direction of their trades, making it appear like no
significant difference in equity returns while trading volume increased.
To further understand the results and the fundamental question of Twitter on equity returns, I separated
the Product Recall data into 3 groups: positive abnormal returns and negative abnormal returns.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Product Recalls
For the positive subgroup, as the impact of the recall increased, the returns became less and less positive
(Figure 1). Perhaps this means that either (1) there is something about the low impact recalls that lets the
firm manage the information content or (2) consumers panic less because it is a seemingly less alarming
issue and/or it isn’t a company they know much about. In order to understand this, I look at the information
Salesper – the increase or decrease in monthly sales compared to the prior period; Salesnum – the gross number of
car sales that month
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content released by the firm both through its announcement and through its tweet. Figure 3 we see that the
mean abnormal returns is lower when the firm includes the reason for the recall in the tweet. Perhaps that
means that a lot of the positive returns are generated because the market cap of the firm is big, so the firm
has more to lose by tweeting about this event. Thus, firms manage information on the tweet. It is also
possible that firms also manage the information content depending on how large the impact or how much
it believes unsophisticated investors will react to the news. In Panel B of Table 2, we see that returns become
less positive as the number of retweets increase. This may be that as dissemination increases, more
unsophisticated investors trade. However, this is unsupported by the data as there is no seeming relation
between Retweets and volume of Trade. Figure 4 does show management of information by market cap,
which supports my earlier hypothesis.
For negative abnormal returns, there seems to be less negative returns in the Post-Twitter than before.
This seems to support the original theory that for recalls that are likely to be more negative, Twitter does
make a difference; the abnormal returns are lower. This is consistent with the result in the product recall
study mentioned earlier (Lee, Hutton, Shu 2015). We see that as market cap increases, there is less negative
returns. Perhaps because high market cap companies manage information content. It could also be because
unsophisticated traders react more to companies they know about (GM, Ford, etc) and they misunderstand
the signals give off.
Additionally, in Figure 9, we do see information content management here as market cap increases.
Even with the divisions into subgroups, AIC does not select PrePost as a regressor at all.
[Insert Table 4 and Table 9 here]
Monthly Sales
In Table 4, we see that the net positive words is much higher for positive sales events than negative
sales events. This makes sense – no clear sense of information management. The puzzling thing about the
data is the fact that there are negative sales events that actually have positive abnormal returns. This begs
the question of whether for negative events (Events =1), do the net positive words in the announcement
change? For negative events, Net_Pos =11.63. For positive events, it is Net_Pos = 19.33. This does indicate
that the firm’s management of content in the announcement leads to positive events.
For positive returns, the return in the post period is actually lower than in the pre-period (Figure 9). I
conclude that for a bad event (Event =1), Twitter actually helps disseminate information and bring it to back
to fundamentals. This result does not hold true for the negative return subset. This is likely because the
market has already fairly priced it, so further dissemination of a bad event with hard-to-misinterpret signals
will not change abnormal returns by very much. This conclusion is supported by the regression results in
Table 9. In Table 7, I find that PrePost lowers the absolute value of abnormal equity returns for monthly
sales announcements. Because the data contains both positive and negative, it hard to understand what is
going on in the results. The regressions in Table 9 provide some insight. As mentioned above, PrePost is
only significant for the positive returns in monthly sales. Here, the results suggest that the advent of Twitter
actually lowers the abnormal returns because it helps disseminate information. We do not see a similar in
Panel A of Table 7 for the negative subset, supporting the idea that for negative returns in the Post-Twitter
period, the market either has likely already priced it and the firm does not further manage content due to
fear of litigation costs. Hence, unsophisticated traders do not trade in a different direction from sophisticated
investors.
In Figure 12, we see as the number of positive words in the tweets increase, we see an increase in
abnormal returns. Then, as the number of tweets increase, we again see a drop in returns. Most likely this

is because for tweets that have high content, the return is near 0 because it should have actually have been
negative and it was “managed” upwards to reach 0.
Figure 13 shows that returns were less negative in the Post-Twitter Period than in the Pre-Twitter Period.
It is possible this is because either the Post-Twitter Period contains more bad news overall or else this can
be attributed to information management of firms in the Post-Twitter Period through their tweets. The PostTwitter period here has 25% true “negative” events while the Pre-Twitter Period had 62% negative events.
This may be a big reason as to why we see a difference in returns – so there is no evidence that firms manage
the information content. Graphically, we also see that the amount of announcement manipulation went up
in the Twitter period. This is probably because there were more positive events in the Pre Period, which
leads to a higher Up_Net overall. Regression results show that for the negative subset, including the %
increase in the Tweet led to higher returns.
Further analysis that there is indeed a difference between the two types of events. For product recalls,
we see that Prepost and all Twitter variables are insignificant; the only relevant variable is impact. For
monthly sales with positive returns, disseminating through Twitter actually lowers the returns. For negative
product recalls, disseminating through Twitter actually makes returns less negative through the managing
information (i.e. including positive sales increases in certain divisions in the Tweet). The cancellation of
the two types of effects is why overall we saw that Twitter does not seem to overall affect price volatility
or volume.
[Insert Table 10 here]
Influential Points
In order to see whether there were any influential points in the dataset, I plotted the Cook’s distance
for the model for returns for both product recalls and monthly sales announcements. For product recalls, 3
points were removed. For monthly sales announcements, 6 significantly influential points were removed.
Table 10 exhibits the regression results once the influential points were removed.
Panel B. Before the influential points were removed, the regressors selected through model selection were
Salesper and Salesnum9. After the influential points were removed, the selected regressors were beta, tone,
UpNet, Salesper, Salesnum, Retweeet, per, and Prepost. Out of those, beta, UpNet, and Salesnum were
significant. Hence, the removal of influential points did not change my conclusion about the role of Prepost.
For log volume, the regressors selected after removing influential points also changed. Before, Prepost,
salesnum, and beta were significant. After removing influential points, link also became a significant
variable. This meant that while a company-initiated Tweet actually decreases the amount of trading,
including a link increases the amount of trading volume. For the absolute value of abnormal returns, PrePost
was significant before influential points were removed. After removal, no variable was significant – only
the intercept was significant. This hints that must be other variables that prove significant for returns.
Panel A. For product recalls, there was no significant regressor for returns. However, the removal of
influential points led to ProblemInfo (whether the company discloses the reason for the recall on Twitter)
being significant. The negative coefficient suggests that as firms disclose the reason for the recall on Twitter,
the abnormal returns are negative. This is consistent with the original hypothesis. Before the points were
removed, the market cap and the number of times a company tweet is retweeted by the public were
significant. Afterwards, there was no significant regressor. The significant intercept here also hints that there
9

Salesper- the % increase or decrease of monthly sales compared to the same month the previous year
Salesnum- the gross number of sales for that month

is an explanation for the abnormal returns outside of the given regressors. It is likely to be unrelated to the
company-initiated tweet. For volume, Prepost and Retweet were significant. However, the removal of
influential points led nothing to be significant after.
Whether these points should have been removed or not is controversial. For one, removing so many
points from an already limited data-set would be removing valuable information. Secondly, none of the
removed points had a Cook’s distance of more than 1, indicating that it could still perform fine for the
regression. Another reason why the results above for log(volume) may not have been valid is because when
I plotted the Cook’s distance for return, there were highly influential points. Removing them may have
made for a better analysis. However, when I plotted Cook’s distance for the former model for log(volume),
there were very few influential points. Hence, removing the points that affected the model for return would
possibly improve the model for return, but it would certainly hurt the model for volume. Perhaps that is
why we saw the volume for both product recalls and monthly sales announcements become insignificant
after the removal of the points.

V.

Further Analysis and Potential Issues

One significant issue with the analysis above is that variable PrePost, the variable measuring
voluntary disclosure, is potentially endogenous variable. This is especially true for product recalls
where the ability to manage information within both the announcement and the Tweet is limited because
of potential litigation consequences. This can be seen from the data; firms tended to limit the
management of the information for disclosures, even within Tweets. Because the sample data contains
only product recalls that were tweeted about post 2008, I face a bias because those firms chose to
disclosure for reasons that may or may not be controlled for in the data. Out of all the firms that had
product recalls after 2008, very few of them actually mention it on their Twitter. Perhaps this is because
firms are well aware of the fact that this could have detrimental consequences on price volatility and
trading volume, so they purposely do not disseminate through Twitter. Perhaps this is an explanation
as to why PrePost was not significant in the product recall data for both returns and the absolute value
of the returns; the firms who disclose on Twitter product recalls in the first place are under the belief
that the market will not significantly react to it. Hence, we do not see a significant change in price
volatility and only a minor, albeit significant, increase in trading volume. This is especially true as out
of all the product recalls that car companies such as GM, Nissan, Honda, and Ford faced after 2008,
only a small portion of them were discussed on Twitter. The ones that were disclosed were most likely
disclosed because the impact was very high, and the company feared litigation risk and/or believed that
the cost of disseminating to the consumer was lower than the cost of an overreaction to the product
recall from investors. An example would be the recent GM ignition recall in which GM was fire for.
However, some of the less significant recalls may not be disclosed on Twitter due to fear that it would
cause unnecessary price volatility from unsophisticated investors. On top of having a selection bias
with the events, there is a selection bias with the companies selected as well. Only a small percentage
of all firms on Twitter tweet about financial information on their page. For example, firms like Dunkin’
Donuts and Urban Outfitters limit their tweets to information about new products and sales.
Another potential issue is market cap. Companies with a small market cap and a smaller investor
following may abstain from disclosing on Twitter as the reach of their Tweets would not be to a broad
enough audience; this would be a direct violation of Regulation FD. Because smaller cap companies
tend to be firms with lower visibility, these would be the firms that actually might experience higher

price volatility and trading volume as a result of disclosing information on Twitter. This may be another
reason why I did not see an significant change in abnormal returns in the post-Twitter period; the events
featured may have been high profile recalls, and unsophisticated traders were likely to find out about
this recall anyway through the news, etc. This is especially true for car recalls. Additionally, we may
have seen less controlling of information about product recalls on the Tweets because of the language;
one of the advantages of Tweeting is to be able to use words that appeal more to emotion (e.g, “Ford
took the crown in sales this month!”). This is hard to do with a product recall as firms are limited in
their ability to use positive words in connection with a product recall.
A potential way to fix this problem would be through collecting data on firms who had product recalls
but did not disclose on Twitter. While there is a bias here too as it is impossible to observe what the
firm avoided by not disclosing on Twitter, we can still observe the disclosure decision on Twitter with
regards to both the market cap of the firm and the size of the impact. Perhaps controlling for the number
of followers in the period would also allow us to look into the hypothesis about Regulation FD given
above.
The monthly sales data faces less of an endogeneity problem than the product recalls data. This is
because out of the two firms observed in the 4 year period, GM and Honda, both disclosed on Twitter
every month regardless of the type of event. A potential reason for that could be that the potential to
manipulate the information content of both announcements as well as Tweets is much higher for
monthly sales. This is likely because there is less litigation risk from doing so and firms also have more
“material” to work with – both GM and Honda have several divisions and types of cars; even when it
is an overall negative or positive monthly sales events, there is bound to be at least one division or car
that did do well in sales. This can be emphasized in both the announcement and in the car. However,
the problem that monthly sales data faced most likely lay in the frequency of the event. Perhaps
unsophisticated investors might see that that GM or Ford consistently is very positive about sales on
their Twitter page, and they see this every month. This removes the shock factor in the news; they may
not trade on this information as their expectations were already set from the month before. A way to
get around this may be to control for the nature of the monthly sales data one or two months before.
This would mean to use lagged EVENTS on t-1 and t-2 as a proxy for the “expectation” of the
unsophisticated investor.
Perhaps the problem in the results lay in my belief about the unsophisticated investor.
Unsophisticated investors may know that they are unsophisticated; hence, they may rely on opinions
of more sophisticated investors to make their trade. This is not a hard task as the availability of
information and opinions and articles online have increased significantly after 2008. Perhaps the reason
we see no change in price volatility is because after a unsophisticated investor, who is likely to be risk
averse, reads about a product recall or a monthly sales announcement on Twitter, may go to other
sources to corroborate or find out more based on what they read. After they read news articles from
WSJ or other news sources, their interpretation of that event may converge to what the market believes
overall. Hence, they trade in the same direction (or, the distribution of the direction of their trade is the
same as sophisticated investors). Perhaps this can be further researched by looking at the quartiles of the
abnormal returns and how many fall in each quartile for both the post and the pre period. Hence, we would
observe no change in abnormal returns cross-sectionally but an increase in trading volume.

VI.

Conclusion

This study empirically examines whether firms’ use of Twitter as a viable mode of dissemination
of corporate information affects trading behavior. Twitter enables the firm to manage the information
content of the Tweet because of its 140 characters. In addition, the marginal investor who may read this
“managed” tweet and react accordingly is most likely unsophisticated since Twitter is an informationpushing platform rather than an information-pulling platform such as Bloomberg. As a result, I
hypothesize that dissemination through Twitter leads to less negative abnormal returns for product
recalls and bad monthly sales events. Furthermore, I hypothesize that the abnormal trading volume will
increase after the advent of Twitter due to the entrance of unsophisticated traders.
To do so, I look at abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume in a 2 day period after the
announcement of a product recall and a monthly sales announcement. I compare differences between
the abnormal returns and trading volume that tweet about the event on their company Twitter in addition
to sending out a newswire as opposed to when a firm would only post a newswire before the firm
created a company Twitter account.
I document a relationship between the log of abnormal volume and firm-initiated announcement
tweets for both product recalls and monthly sales announcements. However, the relationship is actually
a negative one suggesting that either trading volume actually decreased or that the rate of increase of
trading volume decreased. The second one is the most likely explanation due to the fact that the sample
takes place shortly after the financial crisis where many retail investors were not in a place to casually
trade on information, so the rate at which trading volume increases took a hit. I also document a
negative relationship between the absolute value of abnormal equity returns and firm-initiated
announcement tweets for monthly sales data. Further analysis shows that this relationship holds true
only for monthly sales events with positive returns and not for those with negative returns. This
suggests that it is because Twitter serves to lower information asymmetry, resulting in less positive
returns than before. This also means that either firms fail to successfully manage information content
or else do not attempt to through Twitter. Hence, I conclude that Twitter as a mode of dissemination
does lead to higher market efficiency as opposed to asset mispricing as a result of unsophisticated
traders trading away from the fundamental value.

Table 1: Summary Statistics using all data
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for product recall announcements and Panel B provides
descriptive statistics for monthly sales announcements. The mean return for monthly sales
announcements is higher than product recalls, as expected. The absolute return between the two types
is very similar, which is surprising given that monthly sales announcements have positive events, so
we might expect a significantly abnormal higher return. The volume of trade around a product recall
is much higher than a monthly sales announcement. This could potentially be explained by the entrance
of unsophisticated traders. Other common variables they share are link – 33.7% of all product recall
data contained a link. 43% of all monthly sales announcements contain a link.

Product Recalls
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Equity Returns for Product Recalls
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the negative returns in the sample. Panel B provides
descriptive statistics for the positive returns in the sample. It is interesting that the mean of the negative
sample almost perfectly cancels out the mean of the positive sample. Positive returns had slightly lower
average ln(volume). The mean market cap of firms with negative returns around a product recall is 80
M compared to 67 M for positive returns. We also see that firms with positive returns also have a higher
number of retweets and only 57% of them contain a link compared to the 70% of negative returns that
contain a link. For negative returns, 58.3% of firms had provided the reason for the negative recall
compared to the 36.8% of firms with positive returns that had provided it. The most interesting statistic
in this dataset is the fact that the mean impact for the positive returns is actually 12 B compared to 9 B
for negative returns.

Table3: Summary Statistics by Time Period for Product Recall
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the Pre-Twitter subsample. Panel B provides descriptive
statistics for the Post-Twitter subsample. It is interesting to note that the average return for the postTwitter sample is -.002 while the average return for the Pre-Twitter sample is .003. Additionally, it
actually appears as though the mean trading volume has actually decreased in the Post-Twitter sample
which directly contradicts the hypothesis. The fact that the average mean impact is a similar number
in both periods is good to know; this implies that there is no cross-sectional difference between the
“seriousness” of the recall. Additionally, the average market cap of the Post Twitter period is
substantially higher than in the Pre Twitter period. This may imply that there is substantial bias in the
data collection; only large companies may Tweet about recalls on Twitter.

Monthly Sales Announcements
Table 4: Summary Statistics by Returns for Monthly Sales
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for monthly sales announcements that resulted in negative
abnormal returns. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for monthly sales announcements that resulted
in positive returns. Panel C gives summary statistics for the Twitter variables for negative returns, and
Panel D provides summary Statistics for the Twitter for positive returns. This was broken out this way
because only around half the data points have data for the Twitter Variables because they belong in the
Post-Period results.
We note that just as for product recalls, the average return for negative returns versus positive returns
almost perfectly cancels each other out. Positive returns have a higher log volume than negative returns.
For positive returns, the salesnum is substantially higher than for negative returns. The number of
retweets of the company tweet is also higher for positive returns. Additionally, the positive return
events have a higher number of tweets posted by the company than the negative.

Table 5: Summary Statistics by Period – Monthly Sales
Panel A provides descriptive summary statistics for the Pre-Twitter period. Panel summarizes key
statistics in the Post-Twitter period. We see that the mean return for monthly sales in the Post-Twiter
period is higher than in the Pre-Period. Could this be explained by disemmination through Twitter?
Trading volume in the Post-Period is higher than in the Pre-Period? We also note that tone has changed
substantially in the Post-Twitter period – companies rarely post a neutral sales announcement now. We
also note that mean gross sales has decreased in the Post-Twitter period. Additionally, 75% of all
Tweets contain links to the original corporate announcement and 73% contain the percentage of sales
increase compared to the prior year in the Tweet. 53% of all tweets contain information about the gross
number of sales that month.

Table 6: Summary Statistics by Type of Event for Monthly Sales
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for negative monthly sales. This means that compared to the
same month the previous year, total sales decreased. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for positive
monthly sales or months that did better compared to the same month one year before. We note that that
for negative monthly sales, the tone of the headline of the announcement was neutral 25% of the time
compared to for positive monthly sales where it was neutral only 5% of the time. This makes sense –
during negative sales months, companies would not want to have the headline of the announcement by
negative. Instead, they opt for a neutral headline such as “GM releases May sales”. Additionally, we
note that for negative monthly sales announcement, a link is provided in the tweet 80% of the time,
which is interesting. Additionally, I expected the NetSent to be higher in the negative monthly sales
than for the positive monthly sales, which would point to firms managing information content. In order
words, they distract the investor from the negative sales event by overemphasizing the positive aspects
of sales that month, although overall sales decreased.

Table 7: Regression results using Model Selection using all data.
Panel A shows the regression results for product recalls. Here, the full sample of 84 recalls was used.
Panel B shows regression results for monthly sales. The full sample of 93 monthly sales
announcements was used. For volume for monthly sales and product recalls, PrePost was a significant
regressor. This means that all else held constant, firm-initiated tweets made a difference in the trading
volume. However, the constant is very significant for absolute value of the returns for both product
recalls and the monthly sales.

Table 8: Regression results by using negative returns and positive returns for product recalls
Panel A shows regression results for the negative subset of product recalls. This means that I stratified
the recalls into two groups: those that had negative abnormal returns and those with positive abnormal
returns. Under the assumption that those with positive returns exceeded expectation and the ones with
negative abnormal returns did not meet expectation, I look at how company-initiated tweets may have
affected abnormal returns and volume.

Table 9: Regression results for Positive and Negative Returns for Monthly Sales
Panel A shows regression results for the negative subset of monthly sales. This means that I stratified
the monthly sales into two groups: those that had negative abnormal returns and those with positive
abnormal returns. Under the assumption that those with positive returns exceeded expectation and the
ones with negative abnormal returns did not meet expectation, I look at how company-initiated tweets
may have affected abnormal returns and volume.

Table 10: Regression Results after Removing Influential Points
Panel A provides regression results after removing influential points for product recalls (6 points with
a large Cook’s distance were removed). Panel B provides regression results after removing influential
points for monthly sales announcements. The new regression results are somewhat different from the
previous regression. Prepost is still only significant for volume, and it still shows that company
initiated tweets actually reduces the abnormal log (volume). However, including a link to the original
announcement actually increases volume.

Positive Equity Returns – Product Recalls
Figure 1: Return vs. Impact

Figure 3: Return vs. Number of Retweets

Figure 2: Return vs. Info Content

Figure 4: InfoContent vs Market Cap

Negative Equity Returns – Product Recalls

Figure 5: Return vs. Pre and Post Twitter

Figure 6: Average Return per Period

Figure 7: Return vs. Market Cap

Figure 8: Market Cap vs Info Content

Positive Equity Returns – Monthly Sales

Figure 9: Mean Return vs Time Period

Figure 11: Net Positive Words by Event

Figure 10: Net Positive Words vs Time Period
Cap

Figure 12: Returns vs Net Positive Words

Negative Equity Return – Monthly Sales

Figure 13: Returns vs Time Period
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